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Abstract: Kit Fine has proposed a new solution to what he calls
‘a familiar puzzle’ concerning modality and existence. The puzzle
concerns the argument from the alleged truths ‘It is necessary that
Socrates is a man’ and ‘It is possible that Socrates does not exist’
to the apparent falsehood ‘It is possible that Socrates is a man and
does not exist’. We discuss in detail Fine’s setting up of the ‘puzzle’
and his rejection, with which we concur, of two mooted solutions
to it. (One of these uses standard, Kripkean, notions, and the
other rests on work done by Arthur Prior.) We set out, and reject,
the philosophy of modality underlying Fine’s new solution, and we
defend an alternative response to the alleged puzzle. Our solution
follows the work of David Wiggins in distinguishing between the
sentential operator ‘It is necessary that’ and the predicate modifier
‘necessarily’. We briefly provide this distinction with a possible-
world semantics on which it is neither a necessary truth, in some
sense, that Socrates exists nor true, in some sense, that Socrates
necessarily exists.
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. . . if tense logic is haunted by the myth that whatever exists at
any time exists at all times, ordinary modal logic is haunted by
the myth that whatever exists exists necessarily. (Prior 1957, 48)
1 A ‘puzzle of possible non-existence’
(Fine 2005, 328) sets out ‘a familiar puzzle concerning possible non-existence
... by means of the following argument’:
(1) It is necessary that Socrates is a man.1
(2) It is possible that Socrates does not exist.
(3) Therefore it is possible that Socrates is a man and does not exist.
Now (Fine 2005, 329) remarks that ‘the argument appears to be sound . . . yet
its conclusion is unacceptable’. According to (Fine 2005, 329) the argument
has the following valid logical form: p, q : (p & q).
2 Two mooted, but deficient, responses
(Fine 2005, 329) rejects ‘two responses to the puzzle that are implicit in the
literature’. The first response, ‘which’, according to (Fine 2005, 329), ‘derives
from the framework of Prior’s system Q’, employs a modal logic with truth-
value gaps. (Fine 2005, 329) continues that by its lights ‘any proposition
1The sortal involved in the predicate ‘is a man’ is, in one sense (namely that in which a boy is not a
man), a phased sortal rather than a substance sortal. (On the distinction, see, e.g., Wiggins 2001, 30.) In
his discussion, however, Fine is concerned with the first sense of the noun ‘man’ listed in the Oxford English
Dictionary: ‘A human being, irrespective of age or sex’. In order to engage with his discussion without
tampering with his terminology, we follow him in this. All uses of ‘man’ are to be taken to involve a substance
sortal, rather than a phased one. Also, unlike Fine, when we evaluate the truth values of statements about
Socrates, we will suppose (in order to avoid unnecessary complexities and philosophical commitments) that
the time of evaluation is one at which Socrates is alive.
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concerning an object is taken to be neither true nor false in any world in
which the object does not exist’.2 This gives rise to two notions of necessity.
Where A is any truth-bearer, it is weakly necessary that A if and only if there
is no possible world at which A is false. It is strongly necessary that A if and
only if A is true at every possible world.3 The Priorian response puts this
distinction to use as follows. The argument from (1) and (2) to (3) is valid
so long as the modalities are read weakly throughout. When we convince
ourselves that (1) and (2) are true and that (3) is nevertheless false, this is
because we slide from a weak reading of the modalities in (1) and (2) to a
strong reading in (3). Read that way, the argument is invalid.
The second response, which (Fine 2005, passim) calls ‘standard’, and which
might equally well be called ‘Kripkean’, invokes a distinction between ‘qual-
ified’ and ‘unqualified’ necessity. (See Kripke 2011, 3, on weak necessity.) A
statement of the form ‘Fa’ is unqualifiedly necessary if and only if it is true in
all possible worlds.4 It is qualifiedly necessary that Fa if and only if it is un-
qualifiedly necessary that if a exists, then Fa. This is applied to the argument
from (1) and (2) to (3) as follows. The necessity involved in (1) is qualified.
The possibility involved in (2) is unqualified. (3) is then invalidly concluded,
with the sense of possibility involved in (3) being the unqualified sense. For
this conclusion to follow, the sense of necessity involved in (1) would need
to be the unqualified sense, which it cannot be if it is not necessary (in the
unqualified sense) that Socrates exists. It is held that it is not an unqualified
necessity that Socrates exists.
We agree with (Fine 2005, 330–4) that both the Priorian and the stan-
dard responses to the ‘puzzle’ are inadequate, not only as responses to the
‘puzzle’ but as philosophies of modality. Crucially, we agree with Fine that
both responses are unable to deny ‘that someone who accepts the necessity
that Socrates is a man is thereby committed to accepting the necessity that
Socrates exists’ (Fine 2005, 331). We take it that this is a problem for the
Priorian and standard accounts because it means that they fail to deliver on
2In order to avoid commitment to propositions, this could be reformulated as follows: a statement is neither
true nor false if it contains an empty name.
3Appeal to possible worlds is not essential here. These notions can be reformulated as follows. It is weakly
necessary that A if and only if it is absolutely impossible that A is false. It is strongly necessary that A if
and only if it is absolutely impossible that A is not true. If there are truth-value gaps, then weak necessity
so formulated is entailed by, but does not entail, strong necessity so formulated. The definitions of modal
notions here are not, of course, reductive. It is questionable whether the appeal to possible worlds really has
an advantage, in this respect, over a position that views modality as primitive.
4Fine formulates this in terms of propositions, not statements.
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their philosophical desideratum that it is in no sense true that ‘whatever exists
exists necessarily’. (In the case of the standard account, see further McLeod
2008.)
Let us show why Fine’s critique of the Priorian and standard responses to
the ‘puzzle’ is correct.
Let ‘E’ be an existence predicate, ‘W ’ be an operator for Priorian weak
necessity, ‘S’ be an operator for Priorian strong necessity, ‘Q’ be an op-
erator for standard qualified necessity and ‘U ’ be an operator for standard
unqualified necessity.
Let us first demonstrate the problem for the Priorian approach. Suppose
that WFa & ¬SFa. It follows from the latter conjunct that there is a
possible world at which it is not true that Fa. It follows from the first conjunct
that there is no possible world at which it is false that Fa. From these two
consequences of the conjunction, it follows that there is a possible world at
which it is neither true nor false that Fa. At that world, it is neither true nor
false that Ea. So, it is not the case that SEa. On the other hand, it follows
that WEa. This is because there is no world at which it is false that Ea,
since the truth or falsehood of a statement at a world depends upon the non-
emptiness, in that world, of the singular terms it contains. On the Priorian
approach, then, it is necessary that Ea in just the same sense in which it is
necessary that Fa. This is a problem for the Priorian approach because, as is
clear from the words of Prior used as this article’s epigraph, Prior intended to
reject the idea that there is a sense in which concrete objects exist necessarily.
The standard approach faces the same diﬃculty. Suppose that QFa &
¬UFa. It follows from the latter conjunct that there is a possible world at
which it is false that Fa. It follows from the first conjunct, by the definition
of qualified necessity, that there is no possible world at which it is false that
¬Ea ∨ Fa. From these two consequences of the conjunction, it follows that
there is a possible world at which it is false that Ea. So, it is not the case
that UEa. On the other hand, it follows that QEa. This is because there
is no world at which it is false that ¬Ea ∨ Ea. On the standard approach,
then, it is necessary that Ea in just the same sense in which it is necessary
that Fa. At least for Kripke, the originator of the standard approach, this
is a problematic result. In a piece invoking weak necessity, (Kripke 2011, 15,
note 11), Kripke is evidently committed to rejecting the idea that there is any
sense in which it may correctly be said that whatever exists exists necessarily.
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3 Fine’s response
3.1 Matters worldly and unworldly
(Fine 2005, 321) contends that there is a distinction, analogous to ‘a distinc-
tion between tensed and tenseless sentences’, between worldly and unworldly
sentences. On the back of this distinction, Fine alleges that the sorts of truths
normally (and properly) regarded as necessary branch into two mutually ex-
clusive kinds: ‘the necessary truths proper . . . and the transcendent truths’
(Fine 2005, 321). Moreover, there are necessary existents, some of which are
‘necessary existents proper’ and others of which are ‘transcendental existents’
(Fine 2005, 321).
The suggestion is not that there are transcendent truths and transcen-
dental existents over and above the necessary truths and necessary existents
alleged to exist by some necessity-friendly metaphysicians. Rather, it is that
necessity-friendly metaphysics usually overlooks some subtleties that are use-
ful (and perhaps even required) for solving modal/existential puzzles and that
are independently plausible (Fine 2005, 322, 328).
Let us set out Fine’s distinctions and then turn to his attempt to apply
them to the supposed modal/existential puzzle.
A truth-apt sentence that is not what Fine calls a ‘hybrid sentence’ is
tensed if and only if ‘it can properly be said to be true or false at a time’ (Fine
2005, 322). Otherwise, it is tenseless. Fine’s examples of tenseless sentences
(Fine 2005, 322) are ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘Socrates is self-identical’; his
example of a tensed sentence is ‘Socrates does not exist’. The predicates ‘is a
man’ and ‘is self-identical’ are in turn classified as tenseless, ‘while a predicate
such as “exists” is tensed’ (Fine 2005, 322).
Now, says Fine, given that we have the distinction between tensed and
tenseless sentences, and so between tensed and tenseless truths, we can make
‘a corresponding distinction between sempiternal and eternal truths, a sem-
piternal truth being a tensed sentence that is always true and an eternal truth
being a tenseless sentence that is true simpliciter.’ In ‘a restricted sense of
truth-at-a-time’ (Fine 2005, 323), only sentences true at some times and false
at others, plus sempiternal truths, are true-at-a-time. In ‘an extended sense
of truth-at-a-time’ (Fine 2005, 323) tenseless truths can be taken to be true
at all times. The tenseless truths then qualify as being true-at-a-time, since
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truth at all times entails, given that there are times, truth at some times.
On the extended conception of truth-at-a-time, ‘an eternal truth will be true
regardless of the time, i.e. regardless of how things are at the time, while a
sempiternal truth will be [true] whatever the time, i.e. however things are at
the time’ (Fine 2005, 323). By way of examples, (Fine 2005, 323–4) remarks
that ‘If the sun will always shine, then “the sun will shine” will be true at
any given time because of how things are at that time . . . while the . . . truth
of “Socrates is [self-]identical” will not depend . . . upon some ongoing feature
of the universe’.
Let us now move from the tensed/tenseless distinction to the distinction
Fine wishes to draw, by analogy with it, between worldly and unworldly mat-
ters. A truth-apt sentence that is not one of Fine’s ‘hybrid sentences’ is worldly
if and only if it depends for its truth-value ‘upon the worldly circumstances’
(Fine 2005, 321). Otherwise, it is unworldly. Among the truths that Fine
takes to be normally and rightly regarded as necessary by philosophers, the
necessary truths are true whatever the worldly circumstances, whereas the
transcendental truths are true regardless of the worldly circumstances (Fine
2005, 324). Fine provides ‘Socrates is self-identical’ as an example of a truth
that is unworldly and transcendental.5 Earlier, it was cited by him as an
example of a tenseless truth. In contrast with transcendental truths, neces-
sary truths like ‘Socrates exists or does not exist’ depend upon the worldly
circumstances. The example is a disjunction, and a disjunction depends for
its truth on the worldly circumstances if and only if each of the disjuncts de-
pends for its truth on the worldly circumstance (Fine 2005, 324, 326); each
of ‘Socrates exists’ and ‘Socrates does not exist’ is a purely worldly sentence.
Fine is supposing that if a set S contains only worldly sentences, then any
compound formed only from elements of S and truth-functional operators is
also a worldly sentence. This entails that a worldly atomic sentence makes any
truth-functional compound containing finitely many instances of that sentence
and no other atomic sentences worldly too.
Fine’s next step is to propound an ‘extended’ sense of truth-at-a-world
to parallel his earlier ‘extended’ sense of truth-at-a-time. Just as there he
had taken the tenseless truths to be true at all times, under the extended
notion of truth-at-a-time, so now he takes the transcendental truths to be
true at all possible worlds, under the extended notion of truth-at-a-world. In
5For Fine, the notions of transcendental truth and of purely unworldly truth are co-extensive.
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the extended sense of ‘necessary’ the transcendental truths may be said to be
necessary, even though in the restricted sense of ‘necessary’ Fine distinguishes
between the transcendental truths and the necessary truths proper. There
is, however, a further extension here whose application to temporality is not
canvassed by Fine, and that is the ‘superextended’ sense of truth-at-a-world.
This applies to ‘all propositions whatever’ (Fine 2005, 326); thus, it applies
not just to the worldly sentences and the unworldly sentences, but also to
hybrid sentences, that is sentences ‘that are composed of both worldly and
unworldly components’ (Fine 2005, 326). An example would be ‘Socrates
does not exist or is self-identical’. This sentence is a hybrid sentence, since
it is a disjunction of a worldly sentence and an unworldly sentence, and is
necessary in the super-extended sense, but not in the extended sense or the
restricted sense.6
3.2 Fine’s application of the worldly/unworldly
distinction to the ‘puzzle’
Recall that the apparent puzzle arises out of the following argument:
(1) It is necessary that Socrates is a man.
(2) It is possible that Socrates does not exist.
(3) Therefore it is possible that Socrates is a man and does not
exist.
The supposed puzzle consists, in the words of (Fine 2005, 329), in the fact
that ‘the argument appears to be sound . . . yet its conclusion is unacceptable’.
For Fine, solving the ‘puzzle’ consists not only in pronouncing on whether the
argument really is sound or not, but also in explaining why our intuitions are
pulled in diﬀerent ways. So, how are Fine’s distinctions meant to help solve
the supposed puzzle?
Fine suggests two hypotheses that are fundamental for his solution: (i)
the hypothesis that ‘we are naturally inclined to use the modalities in an
6For more details about Fine’s conceptions of restricted, extended, and super-extended modalities, see the
Appendix to this article.
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unextended or extended sense, though not in a superextended sense’ (Fine
2005, 335); (ii) the hypothesis that “‘exists” is a worldly predicate while such
predicates as “man” or “identity” are unworldly’ (Fine 2005, 336). So, says
(Fine 2005, 336),
[w]hen it comes to evaluating the first premiss [. . . ], we implicitly
treat ‘man’ as an unworldly predicate (in conformity with the [sec-
ond] hypothesis). We then accommodate the sense of ‘necessity’
to the sense of ‘man’ by taking it in an extended sense (by the first
hypothesis) and are thereby led to accept the first premiss.
Moreover, Fine thinks we are correct so to do, since he thinks ‘is a man’
is an unworldly predicate, and so ‘Socrates is a man’, since it is true, is
a transcendental truth, and therefore an extended necessity. In evaluating
the second premise, ‘we implicitly treat “exists” as a worldly predicate (in
conformity with the [second] hypothesis). We then take “possibility” in the
unextended sense (by the first hypothesis) and are thereby led to accept the
second premiss’ (Fine 2005, 337). Again, we are correct so to do, since ‘exists’
is, according to Fine, in this context, a worldly predicate, and so, given that,
intuitively, it is possible that Socrates does not exist, the sense of ‘possible’
here must be the restricted or unextended sense.
Now, for the dénouement. By Fine’s own earlier definitions, the right
thing for us to do is to take ‘Socrates is a man and does not exist’ to be a
hybrid sentence, since ‘is a man’ is a transcendental predicate and ‘does not
exist’ is a worldly one. On this account the right way for us to understand
the use of ‘possible’ in (3) would then be as a super-extended use, and (3)
would then come out as true. Fine has to explain why we intuitively think
that (3) is false. He says that this is because by his first hypothesis we are
‘disinclined’ to use the super-extended sense of ‘possible’; when we evaluate
the conclusion we now take ‘is a man’ to be worldly (and so ‘possible’ in the
restricted or unextended sense), contrary to how we took it in the first premiss.
Fine explains that ‘under this option, we take the possibility that Socrates is
a man and does not exist to consist in the existence of a possible worldly
circumstance in which Socrates is a man and does not exist’ (Fine 2005, 337),
and it is this that we rightly reject. Why do we (wrongly, by Fine’s lights)
take it to consist in the existence of that worldly circumstance? Fine seems
to think that we are distracted by the presence of the word ‘exist’ in (3) into
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confusing the transcendental predicate ‘is a man’ with the worldly predicate
‘is an existent man’. (To those worried that ‘is an existent man’ ought to be
a hybrid predicate rather than a worldly one, Fine replies ‘we may use the
worldly predicate [“existent”] to qualify the unworldly predicate [“is a man”]
[. . . ] and thereby form a worldly predicate [that] is true in each world of those
objects that are in the world-free extension of the first predicate and in the
world-bound extension of the second predicate’ (Fine 2005, 337).) On our
incorrect, worldly, understanding of ‘is a man’ the premisses do not entail the
conclusion, since the argument is now of the invalid form: Tp, Rq : R(p
& q).
On the correct, unworldly, understanding of ‘is a man’, however, since
‘Socrates is a man and does not exist’ is a hybrid sentence, the sense of ‘pos-
sible’ involved is the super-extended sense. Since Fine thinks that we are
already committed to the interpretation that the conclusion uses the super-
extended sense of ‘possible’, he suggests that we should ‘use the modalities in
a superextended sense throughout the argument’, in which case ‘the conclu-
sion does indeed follow from the premisses and should therefore be accepted’
(Fine 2005, 338). On this hypothesis the argument contains no false premiss
and is of the valid form SEp, SEq : SE(p & q).
Having set out the alleged puzzle, two deficient responses to it and Fine’s
own response, in the following two sections we turn to the evaluation of Fine’s
response and present our own response.
4 Dissolving the ‘puzzle’
We hold, contrary to (Fine 2005, 328), that it is not the case that the ‘puz-
zle’ concerning possibility and non-existence ‘would otherwise be quite baf-
fling’ without our having Fine’s worldly/unworldly distinction at our dis-
posal to help us solve it. (Fine 2005, 328) holds that the application of the
worldly/unworldly distinction to solve the ‘puzzle’ counts as ‘an important
point in its favour’. While we do not argue against it here, the worldly/unworldly
distinction appears to us, like Fine’s version of the tensed/tenseless distinc-
tion, to be contentious. In fact, although we do not develop this point in what
follows, we doubt that Fine has succeeded in articulating any genuine distinc-
tion between matters worldly and unworldly. We will now argue in favour of
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what we think is a better approach to the supposed puzzle than those we have
discussed so far.
On our account, the problem with the argument from (1)–(3) is a lot
simpler than the switch between diﬀerent understandings of necessity put
forward by the responses discussed so far (Priorian, standard and Finean).7
We begin by distinguishing, after (Wiggins 2001, 111–4), between two sorts
of sentence that feature in natural language: statements of necessary truth,
like
(1) It is necessary that Socrates is a man.
and statements of de re necessity like
(1*) Socrates is necessarily a man.
The modal operator in (1) is an operator on sentences. That in (1*) is
embedded within a complex predicative expression and modifies a simpler
predicative expression. We assume, after Wiggins, that statements of de re
necessity are not generally reducible to statements of necessary truth. We
also assume, again after Wiggins, that a true statement of de re necessity,
when it is about a contingent being and contains no operator other than the
modal operator, diﬀers in truth value from its de dicto counterpart (which is,
in virtue of the contingency of the contingent being’s existence, false).
According to this approach, modal logics that employ only sentential modal
operators cannot therefore adequately capture the distinction between modal-
ity de dicto and modality de re (cf. Wiggins 1976, 294). In order to illustrate
this distinction formally, Wiggins employs the device of lambda abstraction,
which is designed to create a predicate into which predicate modifiers can
easily be inserted, and the predicate-modifier ‘nec’.8
(1) It is necessary that Socrates is a man.
[(λx)[Man x], ⟨Socrates⟩]
7Since (Fine 2005, 338) ultimately deems the argument sound, he thinks that the problem mainly lies not
in the argument itself but in our intuitive analysis of it. This marks a diﬀerence between his approach, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the Priorian approach, the standard approach and our own.
8While it is convenient to Wiggins’s discussions and to ours to describe de re ‘necessarily’, and ‘nec’, as
predicate-modifiers, (Wiggins 2001, 111) expresses neutrality over whether these expressions really modify
predicates or rather the copula. For a discussion of these options, and a defence of the view that modal
adverbs are copula modifiers, see (McGinn 2000, Chapter 4).
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(1*) Socrates is necessarily a man.
[nec(λx)[Man x]], ⟨Socrates⟩
Approaches to the de re/de dicto distinction that employ only sentential
modal operators will have diﬃculty in justifiably securing the result that in
statements of necessity de re, like (1*), the name does not occur in an opaque
context (again, cf. Wiggins 1976, 294). It is therein, rather than in considera-
tions about the scope of a sentential modal operator (which is thereby, at least
as normally understood in the literature, an intensional, opacity-producing op-
erator), that the distinction between de re and de dicto modal statements is
genuinely to be identified.
Let us assume, with Fine, and as the surface grammar of its constituent
sentences suggests, that the argument (1)–(3) employs only sentential modal
operators.
We contend, contrary to (1), that it is not, in fact, necessary that Socrates
is a man. We think this because, intuitively, it might have been the case that
there never was such an object as the concretely existent philosopher Socrates,
and, as (Rumfitt 2003, 466) puts it, ‘an object’s existence is a pre-condition for
its being either true or false that the object is such-and-such’. (Rumfitt clearly
means that it is a necessary pre-condition not a merely contingent one.) We
know that Fine disputes Rumfitt’s and our intuitions here, but we are not
persuaded by his attempts (Fine 2005, 345) to explain how something can be
a man without existing.
If, however, we are wrong about this, and (1) is correct, and it is indeed
necessary that Socrates is a man for the reason that Fine gives, viz. that it is
a transcendental truth that he is a man, then we aﬃrm that in that case (2)
is false. If it is transcendentally true that Socrates is a man then Socrates will
enjoy, along with his worldly existence, an unworldly, transcendental form
of existence, and, since this is transcendental, it will be impossible that he
should not have enjoyed it. We know that Fine will reply that, although (2)
can legitimately be taken as coming out false in this way, it is more natural
to interpret it as being about worldly existence and therefore to take it to be
true. All we can say is that we find implausible the proposed switch from
transcendental necessity in (1) to worldly necessity in (2), and that strong
reasons would be required to overcome this implausibility. Moreover, if we are
right that the approach to modality that we propose disposes of the supposed
puzzle, then the strong reasons to adopt Fine’s switch of modalities between
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the first and the second premiss are lacking.
As we remarked in Section 3.2, Fine thinks that solving the ‘puzzle’ consists
partly in evaluating the soundness of the argument and partly in explaining
why our intuitions are pulled in diﬀerent ways when we try to evaluate its
soundness.9 Fine presented the argument as one in which we have two intu-
itively true premisses which, by a valid rule of inference, entail a conclusion
that strikes us as intuitively unacceptable.
We can explain the intuition that (1) is true by saying that, when (1) is
(mistakenly) evaluated as true, it is being taken to be a notational variant of
(1*). We take it that if sortal essentialism is a true metaphysical doctrine and
‘man’ is a substance sortal, then ‘Socrates is necessarily a man’ is indeed true.
Sortal essentialism, does not, we have agreed with Wiggins, entail (1) itself.
Regarding (2), if both the modality and the negation are taken to be
sentential, then the original supposed intuition that (2) is true can be left
intact. After all, we have argued that the embedded statement in (1) (i.e. the
statement ‘Socrates is a man’) is in no genuine sense alethically necessary and
it follows from this, given its truth-aptness, that there is some sense in which
its negation is alethically possible. Reluctance to accept (3) is, we have argued,
entirely well-founded. Even if it is held, for the reasons we have just mentioned,
that (1) and (2) are intuitively true, the attendant reluctance, nonetheless,
to accept (3) does not require the employment of Fine’s distinction between
matters worldly and unworldly (and the distinctions he launches on its back).
We can now set up a dilemma concerning the interpretation of (1):
(1) It is necessary that Socrates is a man.
There are two possible interpretations of (1). The first is that, in line with its
surface syntax, it is a statement that employs a sentential modal operator:
[(λx)[Man x], ⟨Socrates⟩]
The second is that it is to be interpreted as a notational variant of (1*)
(‘Socrates is necessarily a man’), which we formalized as:
[nec(λx)[Man x]], ⟨Socrates⟩
9In discussion, Fine has emphasized to us the importance, in his estimation of the philosopher’s remit, of
the second part of this task.
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Assume, for the first horn of the dilemma, the first interpretation, i.e., that
(1) employs a sentential modal operator. In that case, as we suggested above
(after Rumfitt), (1) entails
(4) It is necessary that Socrates exists.
[(λx)[Exists x], <Socrates>]
Lest this formalization should give the impression that we admit a primitive
first-level existence predicate, we now provide what we take to be a notational
variant of it:
[(λx)[(∃y)y = x], <Socrates>]
This variant employs the well-known classical-logical device of using the ex-
istential quantifier and the identity sign to formalize singular existentials.10
Throughout, when we use ‘Exists’ in lambda translations, we intend to em-
ploy it merely as an abbreviation, not as a primitive first-level predicate.
Let us return to the main business. Provided that the modalities involved
in (1) and (2) are duals and that (2) also employs a sentential modal operator,
and given that (1) entails (4), (1) and (2) form an inconsistent pair. Thus,
no puzzle is generated: the argument is unsound since one of the premises is
false.
Assume, for the second horn of the dilemma, that (1) is to be interpreted
as a notational variant of (1*). As a result, the argument is no longer of the
valid form p, q : (p & q). Instead, the argument is now:
(1*) Socrates is necessarily a man.
[nec(λx)[Man x]], ⟨Socrates⟩
(2) It is possible that Socrates does not exist.
¬[(λx)[Exists x], ⟨Socrates⟩]
10A translation that is more complicated still, though reducible to ours, can be obtained by emulating the
approach suggested by (Wiggins 2003, 486). Thus: ‘[[(∃y)((λx = Socrates], ⟨y⟩]’ . This illustrates the ability
of the lambda notation to reflect the grammatical distinction between ‘Socrates is identical with something’
(our formulation) and ‘Something is identical with Socrates’ (Wiggins 2003).
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(3) Therefore it is possible that Socrates is a man and does not
exist.
[(λx)[Man x], ⟨Socrates⟩ & ¬[(λx)[Exists x], ⟨Socrates⟩]]
Thus, the argument is invalid, since the two premises employ diﬀerent modal-
ities: (1*) uses de re necessity, and does not entail its de dicto counterpart,
while (2) uses de dicto possibility. Once again, there is no puzzle.
5 De re necessity and contingent existence
Our approach to dissolving the ‘puzzle’ involved appeal to a version of the
distinction between necessity de re and de dicto that remains unorthodox.
Relatedly, its technical details remain relatively under-developed. In particu-
lar, it might be objected that our approach does not seem to be readily com-
patible with model-theoretical approaches to the formal semantics of modal
logics. Our response to this objection consists of two points. First, we note
that the form of distinguishing between the logical syntax of de re and de
dicto modal sentences that we have favoured, including the deployment of the
lambda notation, has already been adopted by some authors who also, in fact,
provide both types of sentence with model-theoretical semantics: (Fitting and
Mendelsohn 1998, 85–8, 193, 201, 213, 217) and (Garson 2013, Chapter 19).
Secondly, this section and the next one explain the distinction in more detail
and summarize a model-theoretical semantics that preserves the judgements
made in the foregoing sections about the truth values of relevant modal sen-
tences.
We take it that if Socrates is a contingent being then it is neither necessary
that Socrates exists nor the case that Socrates necessarily exists. Thus, we
take both of the following sentences to be false:
(4) It is necessary that Socrates exists.
[(λx)[Exists x], ⟨Socrates⟩]
(4*) Socrates necessarily exists.
On the assumption that there is no primitive first-level existence predicate,
and that ‘Socrates exists’ contains neither the copula nor such a predicate,
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the ‘necessarily’ in (4*) cannot be either a copula modifier or the modifier of
such a predicate. On our view, given that Socrates is a contingent existent,
(4*) admits of no true essentialist reading, and is significantly diﬀerent from
standard essentialist statements like (1*).
We think that someone unacquainted with formal systems of modal logic
that took (1*) to be true would be unlikely to regard (4*) as true. We think
that such a person would understand (4*) as asserting Socrates to be a neces-
sary being, rather than merely necessarily being a being (or necessarily being
an object). We do not intend this to be a merely pragmatic point. Rather,
our point is that taking (4*) to admit of an interpretation on which it is true
appears to us to be subversion of what the sentence means.11
Someone might oﬀer this formalization of (4*), treating the sentence in
broadly the same manner as (1*) above:
[nec(λx)[(∃y)y = x]], ⟨Socrates⟩
It seems to us that this formalization is apt for (the true) ‘Socrates is neces-
sarily a being’, but is not apt for (the false) ‘Socrates is a necessary being’
and, thus, not apt for (the false) (4*) (i.e., ‘Socrates necessarily exists’).
Our position with respect to (4) and (4*) just spells out what we think
is involved in holding that Socrates is a contingent, rather than (unlike such
supposed cases as God, numbers, and propositions) a necessary, being. With
respect to (4*), we agree with (Fine 2005, 329):
There may be items—numbers or propositions or the like—that
necessarily exist. But Socrates (and Felix) are not among them.
Indeed, it is surely possible that no men (or cats) exist; and from
this it follows, given the appropriate version of the first premiss,
that it is possible that Socrates (or Felix) does not exist.
In denying that (1*) entails (4*), we part company with a philosopher
whose general approach to the distinction between modality de dicto and de
re we share, namely Efird.
11Also, when people that think that there are contingent beings suggest that (4*) is true, we believe that
they interpret (4*) in a way that dilutes its real–and, in philosophy and theology, traditional–meaning. When
theologians say that God necessarily exists they are not appealing to a notion of necessary existence that is
true of all objects. Indeed, we deny that there is any such bona fide notion. The suggestion that there is some
sense of ‘necessarily’ on which (4*) is true seems to us to stem either from the global denial of contingent
existence or from a reconstruction of natural-language meaning in the light of the features of a formal system
of modal logic.
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Efird’s approach combines a Wiggins-style approach to the de re/de dicto
distinction with a Priorian semantics. It has the result (Efird 2010, 107), as
we also contend, that there are no necessary truths about contingent existents.
Thus, to use Efird’s example, it is not the case that it is necessary that Timothy
Williamson exists. Nevertheless, Efird’s approach has the further result (Efird
2010, 97, 107), which ours does not, that Williamson necessarily exists.12
According to (Efird 2010, 107), when the Priorian semantics is adopted:13
we can [. . . ] define a scheme for translating formulas containing
‘nec’ to sentences containing ‘’ and ‘¬’: [nec(λx)(P (x))], [a]=df.
¬¬P (a). This then yields the following [. . . ]:
‘Necessarily, a is F’ is represented formally as: Fa.
‘a is necessarily F’ is represented formally as: (Fa &
¬¬Fa).
‘Contingently, a is F’ is represented formally as: (Fa &
¬Fa).
‘a is contingently F’ is represented formally as: (Fa &
¬Fa).
These formalizations give rise to the consistent conjunctive schema:
‘a is necessarily F and, contingently, a is F’ is represented
formally as: [Fa & (¬¬Fa & ¬Fa)].
As an instance of this conjunctive schema we have: Williamson
necessarily exists, and, contingently, Williamson exists [∃!a& (¬¬∃!a
& ¬∃!a)]. So [. . . ] Williamson is, in a de re sense, a necessary
existent, but he is not a necessary existent in the de dicto sense:
12We note that (Efird 2010, 106) assumes that Wiggins’s account of de re ‘necessarily’ properly applies to
modalized existentials like (4*), and appears to see no diﬃculties with this assumption. We have argued, in
this section, that it does not so apply, and, in so doing, we have made such diﬃculties plain. Also, (Wiggins
1995, 2003) seems to favour treating ‘exists’, as we do, as a defined predicate. So, the proponent of a Wiggins-
style approach to the de re/de dicto distinction does not seem to be forced to go down Efird’s road of taking
it that there is a sense in which ‘Socrates necessarily exists’ is true.
13Efird uses ‘nec’ in place of Wiggins’s ‘nec’, ‘∃!’ as an existence predicate, and square brackets both where
Wiggins would use square brackets and in place of Wiggins’s angled brackets.
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Williamson necessarily exists, but it is not necessary that he ex-
ists.14
Importantly, for our purposes, Efird’s approach has the consequence that
it is true that Williamson necessarily exists. Efird has to aﬃrm, then, that
(1*) entails (4*); indeed, he embraces this consequence. On the interpretation
of (4*) that Efird gives, (4*), though true, does not entail (4), and does not
contradict (2). On Efird’s account, just as each object is necessarily identical
with itself, so each object necessarily exists. Let us set out, and explain the
reasoning behind, our own position. Consider the following sentences:
(5) Socrates is necessarily self-identical.
[nec(λx[x = x]], ⟨Socrates⟩
(6) Socrates is necessarily an existent.
[nec(λx)[Existent x]], ⟨Socrates⟩15
(7) Socrates is necessarily an object.
[nec(λx)[Object x]], ⟨Socrates⟩
(8) Socrates is a necessary existent.
[(λx)[Existent x], <Socrates>]
Supposing that (1*) is true, (5) follows, for whatever is necessarily a man
is also necessarily self-identical. Likewise, and with similar reasoning, (6) and
(7) also follow from (1*). While it is the case that whatever is necessarily a
14It is evident, then, that Efird holds that ‘Williamson is a necessary existent’ is ambiguous. In the main
text, we deny that it is ambiguous. Moreover, even if, as Efird argues, ‘Williamson necessarily exists, and,
contingently, Williamson exists’ is true, it does not follow immediately that there are two senses of ‘Williamson
is a necessary existent’. This is because that sentence employs neither a modal operator nor a modal adverb,
but, rather, a modal adjective. We note, further, that non-existential sentences that employ ‘necessarily’
as a predicate modifier, like ‘Socrates is necessarily human’, do not seem equivalent to the corresponding
sentences featuring the adjective ‘necessary’, like ‘Socrates is a necessary human’: it is questionable whether
these transformations yield sentences that are well-formed and semantically complete, let alone ones that
mean what the source sentences mean. This seems to be a diﬀerence between modalized non-existentials
and modalized existentials, like ‘Socrates necessarily exists’, which do seem equivalent to the corresponding
sentences featuring the adjective ‘necessary’ (in this case, ‘Socrates is a necessary existent’).
15In this formalization, ‘Existent’ is not to be read adjectivally. Compare ‘Object’ in (7).
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man is necessarily an object, and necessarily an existent, it is not the case that
whatever is necessarily a man is a necessary object or a necessary existent.
Thus (8), unlike (5)–(7), does not follow from (1*). While (8) entails that it
is necessary that there is such an existent as Socrates, (6) and (7) do not.
(4*) might at first appear to admit of two diﬀerent readings, namely (6)
and (8). Nevertheless, we see no good reason to view (6) as an admissible
reading of (4*). While whatever exists is necessarily a being, an object, or an
existent, this does not entail that whatever exists exists necessarily: thus, (6)
is logically weaker than (4*). If, as we believe, (6) is an incorrect reading of
(4*), then (8) is the correct reading.16 The distinction between (6) and (8)
seems as clear to us as that between the true ‘Socrates is necessarily a being’
and the false ‘Socrates is a necessary being’. Since (8) admits of no ready
reading on which it is true, and since (6) is not available as an independently
plausible, rather than theoretically forced, reading of (4*), (4*) also admits of
no ready reading on which it is true.
6 Semantics for de re necessity with
contingent existence
While it might be thought that a Wiggins-style approach to the syntax of de
re modality is not readily reconcilable with the standard model-theoretical (or
‘possible worlds’) semantics for modal logics, we noted, at the beginning of the
previous section, that this is not really the case. What has been lacking in the
literature so far, however, is a semantics that secures the intuitive judgements
about the truth values of modal sentences that partly motivate the Wiggins-
style approach, and that is a semantics consistent with the judgement that
there is no sense of ‘necessarily’ in which ‘whatever exists exists necessarily’
is true.
We now specify a semantics fit to accommodate the attribution of de re
16We take this to be so independently of whether the lambda translation given for (8) is ultimately correct.
One reason for doubt here is that in sentences like ‘Socrates necessarily exists’, the alternatives we have
explored leave us with no method of formalization that both captures the logical strength of the sentence
and allows ‘necessarily’ to remain, as it appears, a referentially transparent operator. Also, (8) features not a
modal operator or adverb, upon which modal logics have overwhelmingly concentrated, but a modal adjective.
The logical behaviour of modal adjectives is neither studied as often nor understood as well. There seems to
be work left to do in resolving these diﬃculties.
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necessary attributes to beings that are held to exist contingently.17 Our se-
mantics has the following features.
First, no atomic sentence is a logical truth. In classical quantificational log-
ics, any identity sentence of the form pc = cq is a logical truth. In classically-
based quantified modal logics, any formula of the form pc = cq is normally a
logical truth. (For an exception, see Nelson 2016.) Since, on our account, no
atomic sentence is a logical truth, we avoid the result that, for any arbitrarily
selected object, it is a true statement of de dicto necessity that the object is
identical with itself.
Secondly, our semantics is that of a universally free negative free logic.
That is to say, as well as employing free-logical quantification (Garson 2013,
Ch. 13, esp. 264), and permitting both empty names and an empty domain,
we treat every atomic sentence containing an empty name as thereby false.
Thirdly, the presence of empty names, does not, on our semantics, give
rise to trivially true statements of de re necessity. For example, it is a log-
ical truth, because it is an instance of the law of identity of propositional
logic, that if Pegasus exists then Pegasus exists. As a consequence, when the
weak necessity account of de re necessity is adopted, and extended to natural
language, Pegasus necessarily exists, and, indeed, necessarily—albeit trivially
so—has every property whatsoever, as a matter of weak necessity—see further
(McLeod 2008, 319).
Fourthly, essentialist facts about contingent beings, if there be such facts,
are metaphysical: they are not logical truths. They have the same logical
status as atomic facts. Thus, the de re necessitation of an atomic sentence,
which involves the insertion of a predicate-modifying ‘necessarily’ into the
sentence (as when ‘Socrates is human’ is turned into ‘Socrates is necessarily
human’) will have a result that, like the simpler sentence, is neither logically
true nor logically false.
We now spell out the semantic diﬀerences between, (1) and (1*); we then
provide general semantic clauses for the modal expressions in these sentences.
In what follows, following (Garson 2013), ‘wRv’ means that the possible world
w has access to the possible world v (in other words, v is accessible from w).
‘aw(It is necessary that Socrates is a man) = T’, for example, means that the
sentence in parentheses is true at the world w.18
17We do not here attempt fully to specify a formal system fit for this task. We hope to do so elsewhere.
18Our semantic clause for ‘It is necessary that’ mirrors that of ‘’ in the modal logic K: see (Garson 2013,
64). That for predicate-modifying ‘necessarily’ is diﬀerent.
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Semantics for (1):
aw(It is necessary that Socrates is a man) = T if and only
if, for each possible world, v, such thatwRv, av(Socrates
is a man) = T.
Semantics for (1*):
aw(Socrates is necessarily a man) = T iﬀ aw(Socrates
exists) = T, and for each possible world, v, such that
av(Socrates exists) = T and wRv, av(Socrates is a man)
= T.
Semantics for ‘It is necessary that’:
aw(It is necessary that c is A) = T iﬀ for each v such
that wRv, av(c is A) = T.
Now let A be a primitive predicate (that is, one that is not defined using
any item, other than the identity sign, from the logical vocabulary).19 With
this restriction in place, we now specify our semantics for predicate-modifying
‘necessarily’.
Semantics for predicate-modifying ‘necessarily’:
aw(c is necessarily A) = T iﬀ aw(c exists) = T and for
each v such that av(c exists) = T and wRv, av(c is A)
= T.
On these semantics, (1), but not (1*), entails that it is necessary that Socrates
exists. Moreover, (1*) does not entail, in any bona fide sense of ‘necessar-
ily’, the sentence ‘Socrates necessarily exists’. Our semantics for predicate-
modifying ‘necessarily’, though simple, is intended to achieve the breakthrough
of providing for a Wiggins-style account of the de re/de dicto distinction a
19While this restriction may go further than is strictly necessary in that it excludes all defined predicates,
it is motivated by the case of ‘exists’, as discussed in Section 5 above. The discussion there was intended, in
part, to show that the exclusion of ‘exists’, at least, from the clause for predicate-modifying ‘necessarily’ was
not an arbitrary restriction.
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model-theoretical semantics that allows there to be true statements of de re
necessity about contingent beings, without having the result that, in some
sense of ‘necessarily’, the statement ‘whatever exists exists necessarily’ is true.
The defined status of the existence predicate means that ‘Socrates necessar-
ily exists’, for which our semantic clause for predicate-modifying ‘necessarily’
does not account, must be parsed in one of the following ways:
(9) It is necessary that there is something with which Socrates is
identical.
(10) There is something that is necessarily identical with Socrates.
On the first parsing, which is the one that both natural language and tra-
ditional philosophical and theological parlance about necessary beings would
suggest to be appropriate, there is (unlike in cases that feature a primitive
monadic predicate) no semantic diﬀerence between ‘Socrates necessarily ex-
ists’ and ‘It is necessary that Socrates exists’. (Given that it is not the case
that Socrates exists in all possible worlds, both sentences are false.) Parsed
in the second way, ‘Socrates necessarily exists’ is true, but its surface form
very much belies both its logical form and its semantics. Moreover, the pro-
posal that the sentence ought to be so parsed is one for which we see no good
rationale and against which we have already argued in Section 5.
7 Conclusion
We conclude that the argument from (1)–(3) is unsound, and that it does
not generate any deep puzzle. The predominant reason given by Fine for
subscribing to the worldly/unworldly distinction is as a means of solving the
‘puzzle’, with any other reasons being only alluded to, rather than spelled out,
in his piece. Thus the distinction is, on the evidence Fine presents, under-
motivated. In the case of the supposed puzzle, at least, it is unnecessary. Also,
and perhaps more significantly, a Wiggins-style approach to the distinction
between de re and de dicto modality not only dissolves Fine’s puzzle, but can
be provided with a formal semantics that secures some of the philosophical
motivations of that approach. These include reconciling true statements of
de re necessity about concrete objects with the denial that there is a sense
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of ‘necessarily’ in which the statement ‘whatever exists exists necessarily’ is
true.
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8 Appendix: Fine on modalities
8.1 Grades of modality
The purpose of this technical appendix is to further our understanding, and
that of the reader, of the distinctions between modal notions that Fine makes
in his article and to develop some details left aside in it. (This is despite our
own scepticism about the need for, and indeed desirability of, these distinc-
tions.) While we acknowledge that it would be useful to do this for quantified
modal logic, we restrict our attention to sentential modal logic.
Recall that Fine distinguishes between restricted and extended modalities.
Let ‘R’ be a subscript for restricted modality, ‘T ’ be a subscript for transcen-
dental modality, and ‘E’ be a subscript for extended modality. Where A is any
truth-valued sentence that is either purely worldly or purely unworldly,20 we
shall now define restricted, transcendental, and extended notions of necessity
and possibility. We take our definitions to spell out those of (Fine 2005, 325–
7), although ours diﬀer from his in that ours do not place the same emphasis
20Such sentences contrast with the ‘hybrid’ sentences with which we are concerned in Section 8.2 below.
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on possible worlds. These definitions are not of operators in a formal language,
as box and lozenge are normally taken to be, but instead are definitions of
meta-linguistic predicates attached to names of sentences, after (Quine 1953):
‘Nec’ and ‘Poss’ are short for ‘is necessarily true’ and ‘is possibly true’.
(Def PossR) PossRA =df there is some worldly circumstance, c,
such that ac(A) = T.21
(Def NecR) NecRA =df PossRA & ¬PossR¬A (i.e., for every worldly
circumstance, c, ac(A) = T).
(Def NecT ) NecTA =df A is true & ¬PossRA (i.e. A is true and
yet there is no worldly circumstance, c, such that ac(A) = T).
(Def PossT ) PossTA =df NecTA.22
(Def NecE) NecEA =df NecRA∨ NecTA.
(Def PossE) PossEA =df PossRA∨ PossTA.
8.2 Super-extended modalities
(Fine 2005, 326) asserts that the idea of super-extended truth (SE-truth)
(and so that of super-extended necessity (SE-necessity)) ‘applies to “hybrid”
propositions. These are propositions . . . that are composed of both worldly
and unworldly components. Their truth-value in a given world turns partly
on the worldly facts and also partly on the transcendental facts’.23
Fine also allows for (i) hybrid predicates, i.e. predicates containing at least
one worldly part and at least one unworldly part, e.g. ‘is existent and is a
man’; cf. (Fine 2005, 338), and (ii) hybrid terms, i.e. terms containing at least
21The restriction to worldly circumstances is necessary so as to rule out transcendental truths.
22The notions of transcendental truth, transcendental necessity and transcendental possibility are co-
extensive.
23As may already be evident, we prefer to work with the idea of the sentence rather than that of the
proposition.
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one worldly part that is semantically significant and at least one unworldly
part that is semantically significant, e.g. ‘the singleton set of Socrates’.24
Despite his allowing for these two categories, we shall presume that, for
Fine, any hybrid sentence must be truth-functionally complex, i.e. that there
are no atomic hybrid sentences. This is for four reasons. First, it is simpler to
analyse logically complex predicates in a truth-functional way, i.e. it is simpler
to analyse ‘Socrates is existent and is a man’ (for example) not as an atomic
sentence featuring the single predication of a conjunctive predicate, but rather
as a conjunction of two sentences each featuring a single predicate predicated of
an identical subject, thus ‘Socrates is existent and Socrates is a man’. Secondly,
Fine holds that compound predicates in which one element qualifies the other
are not hybrid, thus ‘existent man’ (for example) is a worldly predicate, not a
hybrid one (Fine 2005, 337). Thirdly, Fine holds that sentences containing a
hybrid name are not on that account hybrid sentences: their status depends on
the status of the predicates that they contain; thus, ‘the singleton of Socrates
is self-identical’, for example, is transcendentally true. Fourthly, for Fine, a
sentence with a worldly term and an unworldly predicate, e.g. (assuming that
‘Socrates’ is a worldly term) ‘Socrates is self-identical’, is unworldly, and a
sentence with an unworldly term and a worldly predicate, e.g. ‘the number
three is being thought about by Socrates’, is worldly.
Now let A be any compound sentence in a truth-functional formal lan-
guage, or in a truth-functional fragment of a natural language. We now define
what it is to be a hybrid sentence of such a language.
Case i. Where ζ is a dyadic operator and A is a sentence of the form B
ζ C, A is a hybrid sentence if and only if one of the following obtains:
(i) either B or C is a hybrid sentence;
(ii) B is a worldly sentence and C an unworldly sentence, or vice
versa.
Case ii. Where A is of the form ¬B, A is a hybrid sentence if and only if
B is a hybrid sentence.
This concludes our definition of hybrid sentence. Let us now set out a principle
that we shall then use to set up an inductive definition of the super-extended
24(Fine 2005) does not actually discuss hybrid terms, but does discuss hybrid objects using the singleton of
Socrates as an example (Fine 2005, 352).
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modalities (SE-modalities).
(Main Principle)(MP) IfA is extendedly necessary (E-necessary)
then A is super-extendedly necessary (SE-necessary).
If A is atomic then (MP) is the only way in which A can be SE-necessary,
since no hybrid sentence is atomic. Since A is E-necessary if and only if ¬A
is extendedly impossible (E-impossible), and A is SE-necessary if and only if
¬A is super-extendedly impossible (SE-impossible), (MP) entails:
(Supplementary Principle)(SP) If A is E-impossible then A is
SE-impossible.
If A is atomic then (SP) is the only way in which A can be SE-impossible,
since no hybrid sentence is atomic.
(SE-equivalence)(SE) If two contingent (worldly) sentences have
the same truth-value as each other across possible worlds then they
are SE-equivalent; if two worldly or transcendent sentences are
both E-necessary then they are SE-equivalent, and if two worldly
or transcendent sentences are both E-impossible then they are SE-
equivalent. No other two sentences are SE-equivalent.
We also need to make use of the following theorem, which deploys the
notion of SE-equivalence:
Substitution Theorem Let A(B) be a sentence containing an
occurrence of B. A(B) is then SE-equivalent to (B & A(C))∨(¬B
& A(C)) where C is SE-equivalent to B.
In other words, take A(B). Find a sentence, C, that is SE-equivalent to B and
substitute it for B. Conjoin this new sentence with B. This gives B & A(C)
(call this ‘sentence 1’). Then negate B to get ¬B. Conjoin the result with
A(C). This gives ¬B & A(C) (call this ‘sentence 2’). Now disjoin sentence 1
with sentence 2 to get (B & A(C))∨ (¬B & A(C)). This can easily be seen to
be equivalent to A(B). (Proof: suppose (i) that both A(B) and B are true,
then the first disjunct, sentence 1, will be true. Suppose (ii) that A(B) is true
and B is false, then the second disjunct, sentence 2, will be true. Suppose (iii)
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that A(B) is false and B is true, then both disjuncts, sentence 1 and sentence
2, will be false. Suppose (iv) that both A(B) and B are false, then again both
disjuncts, sentence 1 and sentence 2, will be false.)25
We know that every hybrid sentence contains as a proper part at least one
unworldly sentence. These unworldly sentences will play the role of B above.
We make continued use of the substitution theorem until every embedded
unworldly sentence in A has been removed and replaced with an SE-equivalent
worldly sentence (e.g. ‘Socrates exists or does not exist’ if the unworldly
sentence is transcendentally true, and ‘Socrates exists and does not exist’ if
the unworldly sentence is transcendentally false)—these sentences will play
the role of C above.
This means that we are left with a (possibly embedded) sentence of the
form (B & A(C))∨ (¬B & A(C)) in which B is unworldly and C is a worldly
equivalent of B. It remains for us to define when this sentence, (B & A(C))∨
(¬B & A(C)), is SE-necessary.
Suppose (i) that B is transcendentally true. It follows that C is a worldly
necessity. It further follows, by (MP) and (SP) above, that B and C are SE-
necessary. We now need to evaluate each of the disjuncts of (B & A(C))∨(¬B
& A(C)). Let us start with the first disjunct. Since A(C) is not a hybrid
sentence—all of its component sentences are purely worldly—we already know,
by (MP) and (SP) above, the modal status of A(C): if A(C) is E-necessary
then it is SE-necessary, if it is E-impossible then it is SE-impossible, and
if it is E-contingent then it is SE-contingent. Since B is SE-necessary, and
a conjunction is SE-necessary if and only if each conjunct is SE-necessary
(since, by its truth-table, a conjunction is true when and only when both its
conjuncts are true), it follows that if A(C) is E-necessary then B & A(C) is
SE-necessary, if A(C) is E-impossible then B & A(C) is SE-impossible, and if
A(C) is E-contingent then B & A(C) is SE-contingent. But since the second
disjunct is SE-impossible (since ¬B is SE-impossible), irrespective of A(C), it
follows, further, that if A(C) is E-necessary then B & A(C) ∨ (¬B & A(C))
is SE-necessary, if A(C) is E-impossible then (B & A(C)) ∨ (¬B & A(C)) is
SE-impossible, and if A(C) is E-contingent then (B & A(C))∨ (¬B & A(C))
is SE-contingent.
Suppose (ii) that B is transcendentally false. It follows that C is a worldly
impossibility. It further follows, by (MP) and (SP) above, that B and C are
25We are very grateful to Kit Fine for drawing our attention to this.
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SE-impossible. We need, again, to evaluate each of the disjuncts of (B &
A(C))∨ (¬B & A(C)). Let us start with the second disjunct. Again, by (MP)
and (SP) above, we already know the modal status of A(C), since it is not
a hybrid: if A(C) is E-necessary then it is SE-necessary, if it is E-impossible
then it is SE-impossible, and if it is E-contingent then it is SE-contingent.
But, further, since ¬B is transcendentally true (since B was transcendentally
false), it follows that if A(C) is E-necessary then ¬B & A(C) is SE-necessary,
if A(C) is E-impossible then ¬B & A(C) is SE-impossible, and if A(C) is
E-contingent then ¬B & A(C) is SE-contingent. But since the first disjunct is
SE-impossible, since B is SE-impossible (and a conjunction is SE-impossible
if and only if at least one conjunct is SE-impossible (since, by its truth-table,
a conjunction is false when and only when at least one conjunct is false)),
it follows that if A(C) is E-necessary then (B & A(C)) ∨ (¬B & A(C)) is
SE-necessary, if A(C) is E-impossible then (B & A(C)) ∨ (¬B & A(C)) is
SE-impossible, and if A(C) is E-contingent then (B & A(C))∨ (¬B & A(C))
is SE-contingent.
It may be that (B & A(C))∨ (¬B & A(C)) is itself an embedded sentence,
in which case we just repeat the procedure now that we know the modal status
of (B & A(C))∨(¬B & A(C)). Since every compound sentence will be covered
by repeated applications of this procedure, and since no atomic sentence is a
hybrid sentence, this concludes our recursive definition of SE-modality.
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